





This paper builds on Faure-Grimaud and Martimort’s [Economics Letters 71 (2001)
75-82] analysis of intermediated contracting. I argue that intermediated contracting
permits one form of auditing, in which the sub-contract oﬀered to the ﬁrm is examined,
contingent on the intermediary’s report. Auditing reduces the intermediary’s rent and
increases allocative eﬃciency.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2001)1 in a three-tier model with principal, intermediary,
and productive agent have ﬁlled an important lacuna in the literature of regulatory con-
tracting under delegation and supervision by addressing an aspect that had been overlooked
previously. In their setting, the principal delegates the design of the contract to the inter-
mediary2 (regulator) to induce production by the productive agent (ﬁr m )t h a tc a nb eo f
three types. Since the design of the sub-contract oﬀered by intermediary is not contractible,
a new form of agency cost arises: The intermediary can appropriate some of the information
rent provided in the budget to permit production by one of the two most eﬃcient ﬁrms,
by playing a gamble and oﬀering a contract that only the most eﬃcient ﬁrm would accept.
If the intermediary is lucky and the agent is of the most eﬃcient type, she can pocket a
surplus.
The FGM model’s merit is to derive a form of agency costs directly from the limits in the
contract design when an intermediary is needed to ﬁlter out an unwanted third type from
producing. In turn, leaving the intermediary this freedom is costly: Should truth-telling be
ensured and the intermediary be kept from gambling, the principal needs to increase her
information rent.
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1henceforth FGM.
2As common in this literature, I use female pronouns for the intermediary.
1Interesting as this viewpoint is as a next step toward a theory of bureaucracy, the FGM
model still rests on a simplifying assumption, namely that the principal has no further
means to reduce the intermediary’s discretion through some form of bureaucratic control via
internal or external auditing. It is not only useful from a theory perspective to clarify which
auditing schemes are accessible to this form of contracting, and contingent on which report
auditing is optimally performed. Under intermediated contracting, the principal cannot
interact with the agent and may remain uninformed ex-post about the terms of the sub-
contract, which intuitively calls for additional measures of control. Public administration
as well as private organizations in virtually all countries make use of auditing policies that
give the organizational design additional bite. Existing Government Auditing Standards3
furthermore underpin the arguments presented in this paper.
2 The Grand-Contract in the FGM Model
This section provides a brief summary of the Grand Contract in the FGM model.4 The
agent’s type space Θ = {θ,ˆ θ,θ} includes the possible marginal costs of production. Type
θ has excessive marginal costs such that it never should be oﬀered a contract. To avoid
type θ to produce, the principal hires the intermediary. I use the following notation for
the distribution of prior beliefs for the three types, namely (1 − p)ν,(1 − p)(1 − ν), and p.
The timing of the contracting game including principal (P), intermediary (I) and agent (A)
reads as follows:
Al e a r n s Po ﬀers a If accepted, I learns A accepts or Output and
its type Grand-Contract A’s type if θ, else she rejects. I reports transfers,
oﬀers a sub-contract A’s type [and auditing].
––×––––––×––––––––×–––––––×––––––×–>
The principal maximizes S(q)−s, with s denoting the budget, and with a marginal surplus
of S0 > 0, with S” < 0. The intermediary has a VNM utility function of V (s−t)=1−e−r(s−t)
r .
The risk-neutral ﬁrm receives a transfer t.5
FGM (2001:79) have shown that principal can design a delegation-proof grand-contract with
budget and production targets of (s = s(q),q),(ˆ s = s(ˆ q), ˆ q),(s = s(q),q = q(θ)=0 ) .U s i n g
υ = s − θq and ˆ υ =ˆ s − ˆ θˆ q to denote the intermediary’s information rents for the ﬁrm’s
respective types θ or ˆ θ, the downward incentive constraints can be expressed as
υ ≥ ˆ υ + ∆θˆ q (1)
and
3GAO (2003).
4Two errata in the original FGM paper somewhat harm the readability of their interesting model:
- The condition assuring the Principal to not induce the extremely ineﬃcient type (page 77, line 5) should







er∆θˆ q−ν <S ’(0) <θ
∞.
- The intermediary’s interim particiaption constrain t( 9 )o np a g e7 9s h o u l dr e a di nt h eo r i g i n a ln o t a t i o n :
νV(υ − ∆θq)+( 1− ν)V (υ) ≥ 0.
5As in the standard screening contract, the agent’s participation constraint for the less eﬃcient type
b u ≥ 0, and the incentive constraint for the eﬃcient type u ≥ b u + ∆θˆ q are binding.
2νV(υ − ∆θˆ q)+( 1− ν)V (ˆ υ) ≥ νV(υ)+( 1− ν)V (s(q)). (2)
The intermediary’s two participation constraints are
V (s) ≥ 0( 3 )
and
νV(υ − ∆θˆ q)+( 1− ν)V (ˆ υ) ≥ 0. (4)







S(q) − θq − υ
¢¤
+ p(1 − ν)
h
S(ˆ q) − ˆ θˆ q − ˆ υ
i
− ps(q)( 5 )
s.t.(1),(2),(3),(4), with (1) binding and (2) rewritten as
V (ˆ υ) ≥ νV(ˆ υ + ∆θˆ q). (6)
Proposition 1 (FGM 2001) The grand-contract does not entail any distortion on the ef-




er∆θˆ q−ν to the downward output distortion.6
The optimal contract leads the following output scheme:
S0(qI)=θ
and





An interior solution exists if the principal’s objective function is strictly concave and |S”(.)|




er∆θˆ q−ν <S ’(0) < θ must hold to ensure that the
principal does not want to have the θ-type in the regime.
Equation (6) is essential for an understanding of the limits of this design: The interme-
diary may risk to oﬀer oﬀer a shutdown contract to the ﬁrm. which will be only accepted
by the θ-ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm turns out to be of type θ, this permits the intermediary to pocket
the virtual costs ∆θˆ q herself; if the agent is of type ˆ θ, she would misreport to the principal
this type to be of θ . To ensure compliance, the intermediary receives a compensation: ˆ υ
is increased to fulﬁll (6). The more risk averse the intermediary, the easier it is for the
principal to do so; an r close to inﬁnity creates an upper bound on the information rent.
6See FGM (2001:79).
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It is unlikely to ﬁnd real-world organizations that do not further restrict the intermediary’s
discretion by including some form of bureaucratic control into the contract design. What
we observe is a variety of organizations that use diﬀerent rules and control schemes to limit
the freedom of intermediate agents. Typically, auditing standards are designed to curb
bureaucratic discretion to an optimal degree, given that veriﬁability is limited and auditing
is costly.
Intermediated contracting and the information structure of the gaming imposes some
limits on the design of an auditing scheme.7 The principal cannot interact with the ﬁrm but
receives the intermediary’s report from which he can infer the existence of a subcontract.
This calls for a speciﬁc auditing scheme in which the principal does not audit the ﬁrm but
examines whether sub-contract was carried out according to his intention. As explained
below, such a treatment is not only intuitive, it follows directly from the principal’s design
options and the timing of the game.
3.1 Incentive-Feasible Auditing Mechanisms
To extend the Grand Contract design to include auditing I start with the following assump-
tions on how the auditing process is carried out:
Assumption 1 The principal cannot interact with the ﬁrm but designs a Grand Contract
that involves examination and potential punishment of the intermediary, not of the ﬁrm.
Assumption 2 Auditing occurs contingent on the intermediary’s report e θ ∈ {θ,ˆ θ,θ}.
Assumption 1 follows from the FGM model and is appropriate since the intermediary is
hired to design a screening contract in order to have both the b θ and θ type in the regime.
The intermediary is hired to ﬁnd out the extremely ineﬃcient type θ but not to reduce the
virtual costs that are necessarily included in the budget to ensure truth-telling by the θ−
ﬁrm in a screening contract. Inﬂicting a punishment both on the intermediary and the ﬁrm
would contradict the principal’s intent to hire an intermediary.
Assumption 2 is appropriate when the auditor cannot ﬁnd evidence without an existing
sub-contract and the ﬁrm as third party is not known. It is also appropriate in cases in
which the intermediary would be required to keep track of her (sub-)contract oﬀer but no
auditor may be able to reconstruct whether this documentation represents the true oﬀer
at the time it was made. An auditor, being unable to verify the state of nature cannot
produce pertinent information. Without loss of generality I therefore limit auditing to an
investigation in the case in which a sub-contract exists between intermediary and ﬁrm.
Proposition 2 Since auditing is costly, the principal optimally designs a Grand-Contract
in which the intermediary is audited if and only if she reports to the principal that the agent
is of type θ.
Proof. Case 1: The intermediary reports e θ = θ. No sub-contract exists, and the report
c a ne i t h e rb et r u eo rf a l s e ;i nt h ec a s eo fal i et h et r u et y p ei sθ = b θ. This reveals that the
7I exclude the unrealistic case of full veriﬁability, with marginal costs of auditing low enough to detect the
true state with certainty. This occurs without loss of generality and can be seen as a borderline case. Under
full veriﬁability the FGM eﬀect would simply disappear and the model reduces to a two-tier principal-agent
setting without further distortion.
4intermediary lost her gamble when oﬀering the shutdown contract. The principal does not
lose money and the intermediary was unable to reap any rent.8
Case 2: The intermediary reports e θ = b θ. This can only be a true report, and θ = b θ. A
sub-contract was signed, and the report e θ = b θ implies that the sub-contract was a (screening)
contract designed for both types of ﬁrms, and the ﬁrm was of type b θ. This all occurred
according to the principal’s intention, and we have no need for auditing.
Case 3: The intermediary reports e θ = θ. Only this case will be audited. A contract was
signed but only costly examination can reveal if the intermediary has oﬀered a shut-down
contract, accepted by the θ-ﬁrm. This sub-contract did not include the virtual costs ∆θˆ q in
the budget and is captured by the misreporting intermediary.
Costs and probabilities of auditing relate as follows. The principal has now access to an
(internal or external) audit technology that permits to detect the true state of the sub-
contract with probability ℘, while incurring strictly convex costs of auditing c(℘), and
c(0) = 0,c 0 > 0, and c” > 0. I assume that the Inada conditions c0(0) = 0,c 0(1) = +∞ are
fulﬁlled.
The Grand-Contract, in addition to output targets q and budgets s now also includes the
probability of audit ℘(e θ) and a punishment P(θ,e θ). Since auditing is costly, I furthermore
limit this probability to ℘ since auditing can only reveal additional information when the
announced type was e θ = θ. The punishment Ps is inﬂicted on the intermediary in the case
a shutdown-contract was signed. I assume endogenous punishment, which implies that the
intermediary is punished up to her information rent in case of a detected lie:
Ps ≤ ∆θˆ q. (7)
Auditing under intermediated contracting relaxes the intermediate’s incentive constraint
(6) into
V (ˆ υ) ≥ ν[℘V (ˆ υ + ∆θˆ q − Ps)+( 1− ℘)V (ˆ υ + ∆θˆ q)], (8)
which reveals that the intermediary, with probability ℘ is inﬂicted a punishment Ps in the
case auditing detects a lie, while with probability 1−℘ she still keeps her information rent
as before. The information rent that the intermediary can claim is therefore reduced. With
(7) binding, (8) reduces to
V (ˆ υ) ≥ ν[℘V (ˆ υ)+( 1− ℘)V (ˆ υ + ∆θˆ q)]. (9)
Solving (9) for ˆ υ s h o w st h a tt h i sr e n ti sn o wˆ υ = 1
r ln 1−νe−r(1−℘)∆θˆ q
1−ν . This permits to derive
the closed-form expression of the Grand-Contract:
8Hiring an auditor in this case would furthermore contradict the basic assumptions of intermediated
contracting: since the intermediary was exactly hired because of his ability to discover the type θ without
incurring any cost, it is not intuitive to hire a next supervisor or auditor to perform the same task.
5max
{(s,q),(ˆ s,ˆ q),(℘),(s)}




1 − νe−r(1−℘)∆θˆ q
1 − ν
− (1 − ℘)∆θˆ q




1 − νe−r(1−℘)∆θˆ q
1 − ν
)] + ps, (10)
and to sum up the ﬁndings under the following propositions:
Proposition 3 Under auditing, the Grand-Contract entails no distortion on the eﬃcient
coalition’s output:
S´ (qA)=θ.
The information rent that the intermediary can obtain is reduced under auditing. The
second-best solution for the regime with a ˆ θ-ﬁrm and endogenous punishment now leads to
a lower information rent for the intermediary
S´ (ˆ qA)=ˆ θ + ν









Proposition 4 The principal optimally chooses a strictly positive probability of auditing
until the marginal costs of auditing are equal to the marginal utility of the agent plus the
virtual costs of production.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . Deriving (10) w.r. to q and ˆ q yields the above stated results. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .Deriving the Grand-Contract w.r. to ℘ yields:
ν d
d℘(1
r ln 1−νe−r(1−℘)∆θˆ q
1−ν )+( 1− ν) d
d℘(1
r ln 1−νe−r(1−℘)∆θˆ q
1−ν ) − c ´( ℘)+∆θˆ q . =0 ,
f r o mw h i c ht h er e q u e s t e dr e s u l tc ´( ℘)= ν∆θ
er∆θˆ q−ν +∆θˆ q is obtained. ¥
4 Comparative Statics and Discussion
Firstly, it is easy to see that qI(ˆ θ) < ˆ qA <q sb(ˆ θ) and that the Grand-Contract under
auditing reaches a more eﬃcient allocation since the principal relies less often on output
distortions.
Second, a second-order Taylor expansion of the intermediary’s rent under auditing,
1
r ln 1−νe−r(1−℘)∆θˆ q
1−ν , further reveals how auditing improves the contract design. For small









which shows in its ﬁrst term on the R.H.S. that the stake u that the intermediary can obtain
is lowered since multiplied with (1 − ℘). The higher the probability of auditing, the lower
the rent that the principal needs to include to the intermediary to satisfy (9). The second
term indicates that also the rate at which the intermediary can appropriate this stake is
6aﬀected. The probability of auditing ℘ enters multiplicatively via the term (1 − ℘), both
aﬀecting the stake of the intermediary and its rate.
Auditing makes sense particularly when the intermediary’s risk aversion r is not too high.
The less risk averse the intermediary, the more the principal can beneﬁt from auditing, which
permits to increase allocative eﬃciency. High values of r instead impose an upper bound
on the intermediary’s rent9 and thus on the agency costs of intermediated contracting. The
higher r, the higher ℘ needs to be to show any eﬀect. If r reaches values close to inﬁnity,
auditing would lose its bite.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper sets out to make a simple point. There exists an optimal auditing scheme ap-
plicable to intermediated contracting that follows straightforward from the timing and the
information structure in the FGM model. The principal has the sub-contract examined
contingent on the intermediary’s report. This scheme is not only intuitive since it follows
general auditing practices to bundle the eﬀorts toward contractual states that are worthwile
to be examined. The particular property is that auditing curbs the bureaucrat’s (interme-
diary’s) discretion. The assumptions on intermediated contracting in the base FGM model
render this approach particularly intuitive.
An inﬁnitely risk-averse intermediary does not need auditing; the result here is the same
as in the original model of FGM. But whenever the costs of the audit technology permit
partial revelation and the Inada conditions are fulﬁlled, auditing reduces the rent ˆ υ that
the intermediary can require for executing the contract according to the principal’s will.
Auditing gives the principal additional leeway to improve the organizational design, and to
increase allocative eﬃciency.
6A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s
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